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76-1-601

CRIMINAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
with his fist, drawing blood, caused "bodily
injury" to the victim as contemplated by the
statute. State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

ANALYSIS

Bodily injury.
Deadly weapon.
Facsimile of a firearm.

Bodily injury.
Defendant caused serious bodily injury such
as would create a "substantial risk of death"
when, in attempted rape, he choked victim into
unconsciousness and stabbed her with a pair of
scissors. State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah
1979).
Evidence supported finding that victim suffered sufficient bodily injury to warrant conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
State v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989).
Defendant who struck victim in the mouth

Deadly weapon.
Loaded gun fell within definition of "deadly
weapon" in former Subsection (10) of this section. State v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472 (Utah 1979)
(decided before 1989 amendment replaced
"deadly or dangerous weapon" with "dangerous
weapon" in list of definitions).
Facsimile of a firearm.
Instruction defining ''facsimile of a firearm"
as "any instrument that by its appearance
resembles a firearm" was proper. State v.
Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
224.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 2.
A.L.R. - Sufficiency of bodily injury to support charge of aggravated assault, 5 A.L.R.5th
243.

Stationary object or attached fixture as
deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of
statute aggravating offenses such as assault,
robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law '2= 1, 13.
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Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or
for conduct of another.
Defenses unavailable in prosecution based on conduct of
another.
Criminal responsibility of corporation or association.
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct in name of
corporation or association.

Person under fourteen years old
not criminally responsible.
Compulsion.
Entrapment.
Ignorance or mistake of fact or
law.
Mistake as to victim's age not a
defense.

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Section
76-2-305.

76-2-306.
76-2-307.
76-2-308.

Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of alcohol
or other substance voluntarily consumed - Definition.
Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary termination of efforts
prior to offense.
Affirmative defenses.

Section
76-2-402.
7.6-2-403.
76-2-404.
76-2-405.
76-2-406.

76-2-101

Force in defense of person Forcible felony defined.
Force in arrest.
Peace officer's use of deadly
force.
Force in defense of habitation.
Force in defense of property.

Part4
Justification Excluding Criminal
Responsibility
76-2-401.

Justification as
When allowed.

defense

PARTl
CULPABILITY GENERALLY
76-2-101.

Requirements
responsibility.

of criminal conduct and criminal

No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability.
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1;
1983, ch. 98, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
state, made private appropriation of public
money a felony. State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 53 P.
978 (1898).
In prosecution for grand larceny of steer, trial
court's refusal to permit defendant to testify as
to his intent and belief in possessing and claiming animal was erroneous. State v. Sawyer, 54
Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919).
Intent was an essential element of first degree murder; it was reversible error to refuse to
allow defendant to testify in regard thereto.
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050, 79
A.L.R. 878 (1931).

ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
Mental state.

Criminal negligence.
The bending down of a stop sign at an intersection so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980).
Mental state.
Public officer was not punishable for an act
committed innocently without criminal intent,
where statute, with no reference to mental
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COLLATERALREFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Note,
State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution to Utah's
Depraved Indifference Mens Rea Problem, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 177 (1986).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 129.

76-2-102.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31.
A.L.R. - Giving, selling, or prescribing dangerous drugs as contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, 36 A.L.R.3d 1292.
Key Numbers. -Criminal Law¢.> 19.

Culpable mental state required - Strict liability.

Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable
mental state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
the defendant must have been aware that his
conduct created a grave risk of death to anDepraved indifference.
other, within the definitions contained in the
Cited.
instructions. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1984).
Depraved indifference.
In a prosecution for second degree murder,
Cited in State v. Whitehair, 735 P.2d 39
although the court's jury instruction did not (Utah 1987); In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d
316 (Utah 1988); State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329
expressly treat the element of knowledge, there
was no error since the other jury instructions • (Utah 1989); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487
and the evidence of the defendant's actions left (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Jones, 243 Utah
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
little room for the jury to misunderstand that
ANALYSIS

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am; Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Utah Law Review. - The Mens Rea
Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah
L. Rev. 635.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Note,
State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution to Utah's
Depraved Indifference Mens Rea Problem, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 177 (1986).

§§ 129, 137.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31.
A.L.R. - Employer's liability for assault,
theft, or similar intentional wrong committed
by employee at home or business of customer,
13 A.L.R.5th 217.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ¢.> 20.
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76-2-103.

76-2-103

Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil
action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
-Expert testimony.
Malice.
Proof of intent and malice.
Recklessness.
Willfulness.
Cited.

Criminal negligence.
The bending down of a stop sign at an intersection so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980).
The sole difference between reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide is whether
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death
or was not, but should have been, aware ofit. In
both cases, a defendant's conduct must be a
"gross deviation" from the standard of care
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-

-Expert testimony.
While expert testimony is not required to
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant
accused of homicide, expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden,
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant
physician's trial for negligent homicide involving the death of an infant after a premature
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
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Malice.
Malice was implied or presumed from intentional poisoning and killing of dog belonging to
another person; fact that owner of dog poisoned
by defendant was unknown to defendant did
not preclude finding that poison was administered maliciously. State v. Coleman, 29 Utah
417, 82 P. 465 (1905).
"Malice," as applied to murder, was the wish
to kill, or to do great bodily harm, or to do an act
knowing that its reasonable and natural consequences would be death or great bodily harm.
State v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 237, 214 P.2d 626
(1950).
Proof of intent and malice.
As a matter of general law, intent and malice
could be proven either by direct or circumstantial evidence, or both. State v. Dewey, 41 Utah
538, 127 P. 275 (1912).
Recklessness.
Although defendant may have been actually
unaware of presence of officers when he fired
shots toward police dogs, likelihood of proximity of dog handlers supported jury's finding of
recklessness. State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

A doctor may be held criminally liable only
when the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the doctor's treatment created a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the patient would die, that the doctor should have
perceived but failed to perceive this risk, and
that the risk is of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care. State v.
Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
Willfulness.
Nothing in the definition of"willful" requires
scienter. Willful, when applied to the intent
with which an act is done or omitted, implies a
willingness to commit the act. It does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure
another or acquire any advantage. State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).
Cited in State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah
1986); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah
1989); Silver v. State Tax Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912
(Utah 1991); State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d
1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Contemp. L. 177 (1986).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 130 et seq.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 32 to 39.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ct=>22.

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - J•1dicial Decisions - Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Note,
State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution to Utah's
Depraved Indifference Mens Rea Problem, 12 J.

76-2-104.

Conduct - When defined as offense.

Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it with criminal negligence.
Conduct is also an offense if a person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it recklessly, the
conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it intentionally or knowingly.
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly, the conduct is an
offense also if a person engages in it intentionally.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-104, enacted by L
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-104.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 44.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 129.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ct=>21.
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76-2-202

PART2
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER
76-2-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or other person
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(a) A partner in a partnership;
(b) An officer of a corporation or association;
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such
responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this
state or any other state to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of
incorporation, or other form of registration to transact business as a
corporation within this state or any other state and shall include domestic,
foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corporation sole, as such term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of authority, incorporation, or
other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization
conducted its business in a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate
existence.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-201, enacted by L,
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-201.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
Utah Law Review, - Note, Utah's Statute
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Liability: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988
Utah L. Rev. 847.

Am. Jur. 2d. § 224.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 127.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=o1, 13.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-202.
Cross-References. - Aiding violation of
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Wildlife Resources Code, § 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, § 76-8-306.

76-2-202

CRIMINAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Accomplice.
Aiding.
Application.
Arranging for the distribution of a controlled
substance.
Evidence.
-Accomplice's background.
-Commission of crime.
-Insufficient.
-Sufficient.
Extent of responsibility.
Mental state of parties.
Peace officers.
Relation to former law.
Cited.

Accomplice.
In abortion prosecution, contention of defendant that prosecutrix in voluntarily submitting
to abortion was an accomplice, and hence that
he could not be convicted upon her testimony
was without merit; voluntarily committing
abortion on one's self was a distinct offense and
not part of offense of performing abortion on
another, and such person could not be convicted
as an accomplice. State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149,
38 P.2d 1071 (1934).
Under this section an accomplice is one who
participates in a crime in such a way that he
could be charged with the same offense as the
principal defendant; one who, without using
inducement or persuasion amounting to entrapment, provides only an opportunity to commit a crime to one predisposed to do so, or one
acting at the inducement of a peace officer
trying to uncover violations of the law, does not
come within this definition. State v. Comish,
560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977).
One given marijuana by defendant upon
promising to bring him money later but who
never made payment was not an accomplice to
offense of distribution of controlled substance.
State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1980).
Aiding.
Conviction of murder in the second degree
was proper where defendant prevented the
victim's roommate from assisting the victim,
while three other men forced the victim outside
and beat him to death. State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d
604 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Where entry into store could have been
gained only with outside help and defendant
was seen looking into store when companion
was inside and then was seen walking to rear of
store where ladder was hidden, it was reasonable to infer that defendant had aided and
abetted in burglary, which made him a principal to the crime. State v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 29,
305 P.2d 488 (1956).
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Defendant who drove codefendant to store
that was robbed, waited in car with the engine
running while codefendant entered store, and
drove codefendant to another car one block
away after codefendant had allegedly killed
store owner was a "principal." State v. Murphy,
26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430 (1971).
In prosecution for theft, instruction on aiding
and abetting was prejudicially erroneous where
defendant was not charged with aiding and
abetting, there was no evidence of aiding and
abetting, and it was not proven that any other
person committed the crime. State v. Pacheco,
27 Utah 2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972); State v.
Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 P.2d 808 (1972).

Application.
This section applies to all offenses defined in
the Criminal Code, as well as those outside that
code, except where otherwise specifically provided. State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah
1983).
Arranging for the distribution of a controlled substance.
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and
specifically establishes the offense of arranging
for the distribution of a controlled substance;
therefore, pursuant to former § 58-37-19 and
§ 76-1-103, defendant was required to be
charged with that offense under § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) of the Controlled Substances Act,
and it was error to charge him under this
section. State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah
1983).
A person cannot be charged with aiding and
abetting another when he or she handles the
negotiations and price of a controlled substance, but must instead be charged with
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating to
distribute a controlled substance as specifically
provided in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). State v. Scott,
732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Although jury was improperly instructed on
aiding and abetting rather than on § 58-37S(l)(a)(iv) of the Controlled Substances Act,
because defendant was convicted of possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance
and not of aiding and abetting, the aiding and
abetting instruction was superfluous and not
the basis of the jury's verdict, and the instruction error was harmless. State v. DeAlo, 748
P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Evidence.
-Accomplice's background.
Evidence as to the life history of accomplice
who killed defendant's wife was relevant to
show that the accomplice was susceptible to
manipulation by the defendant and to explain
her motivation to kill the victim, her initial

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
refusal to implicate the defendant, and defendant's role in encouraging accomplice to commit
the crime. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64 (Utah
1993).

-Commission of crime.
Where accessory was brought to trial after
principal had been convicted, the record of
conviction was prima facie proof of principal's
guilt and that crime charged had been committed. State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 P. 456
(1909).
-Insufficient.
Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery
was reversed, because the circumstantial evidence connecting him to his alleged accomplice
and the crime was insufficient to prove that he
was with the accomplice during or immediately
after the robbery and that he had the requisite
mental state for the crime with which he was
charged. State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah
1987).
-Su.ft'icient.
Evidence held sufficient to convict defendant
as an accomplice in the crimes of aggravated
robbery and theft. State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052
(Utah 1985).
Evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find that defendant solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided
another person in the aggravated robbery of a
jewelry store with the requisite intent was
sufficient to support defendant's conviction of
aggravated robbery. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

76-2-203

Extent of responsibility.
A defendant can be criminally responsible for
an act committed by another, but the degree of
his responsibility is determined by his own
mental state in the acts that subject him to
such responsibility, not by the mental state of
the actor. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah
1983).
Mental state of parties.
For§ 76-3-203.1 to apply, a defendant must
act in concert with two or more persons who
would be criminally liable as parties under this
section. Party liability under this section does
not require that the persons involved in the
criminal conduct have the same mental state.
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994).
Peace officers.
University police officer who learned that
drugs could be bought from defendant and
made two purchases was not an "accomplice"in
the commission of the criminal acts. State v.
Comish, 560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977).
Relation to former law.
This section does not vary substantially from
former§ 76-1-44. State v. Shupe, 554 P.2d 1322
(Utah 1976).
Cited in State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah
1986); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah
1986); State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah
1987); England v. Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281
(10th Cir. 1989); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.
Supp. 1528, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992);
State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802 (Utah 1993); State v.
Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 179.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 131.
A.L.R. - Woman upon whom abortion is
committed or attempted as accomplice for pur-

76-2-203.

poses of rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony, 34 A.L.R.3d 858.
Prosecution of female as principal for rape,
67 A.L.R.4th 1127.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law®=>59.

Defenses unavailable
conduct of another.

in prosecution

based on

In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the
conduct of another, it is no defense:
(1) That the actor belongs to a class of persons who by definition of the
offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual
capacity, or
(2) That the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been
convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense or
is immune from prosecution.
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History: C. 1953, 76-2-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-203.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury instructions.
The trial court properly allowed an instruction to the jury concerning whether defendant
was guilty of being an accomplice or accessory
to the death of the victim where, in his own

defense, the defendant raised the possibility of
the involvement of others in the murder. State
v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 179.

76-2-204.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 59.

Criminal responsibility
ciation.

of corporation or asso-

A corporation or association is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to
discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations or associations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the
scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation or association.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-204, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-204.
Compiler's Notes. - As enacted, this section began with the designation "(1)" but did

not contain a Subsection (2); therefore, the
compiler has deleted the "(1)" from the beginning and redesignated former (a) and (b) as (1)
and (2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations§ 2134 et seq.
C.J.S. - 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 736.

76-2-205.

A.L.R. - Corporation's criminal liability for
homicide, 45 A.L.R.4th 1021.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 59.

Criminal responsibility of person for conduct in
name of corporation or association.

A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he
performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation
or association to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own
name or behalf.
History: C. 1953, 76•2-205, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-205.
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76-2-302

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. tions § 1893.

Key Numbers. - Corporations e= 526.

18B Am. Jur. 2d Corpora-

PARTS
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-301.

Person under fourteen years old not criminally
responsible.

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before he
reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the
jurisdiction of or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-301.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
in prosecution where attainment of particular
age is statutory requisite of guilt, 49 A.L.R.3d
526.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e= 65.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

§ 38.

C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 31, 32.
A.L.R. - Burden of proof of defendant's age,
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Compulsion.

(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use
of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not
have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her
husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion
except as in Subsection (1) provided.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-302.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deviationfrom compelled behavior.
Escape.
- Instructions.
Standard.
Deviation from compelled behavior.
Wifewho was asked by imprisoned husband
to break into jail and get the keys and unlock
the doors, but instead gave him hacksaw

blades, was not incapable of commission of
crime because she departed from his coercion
and committed a crime of her own choosing.
Farrell v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117
(1971).
Escape.
In prosecution for escape from state prison,
trial court did not err in refusing to submit to
jury asserted defense of coercion where defen-
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dant admitted his escape but claimed he did so
because of trouble with the prison inmates
caused by his failure to pay for broken radio.
State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390
(1964).
To avail himself of the defense of compulsion
due to threats of violence, a defendant in a trial
for escape must present evidence that he was
compelled to escape by threat of imminent
violence which he could not have reasonably
resisted; for a threat to be imminent, it would
have to appear that it had been communicated
to the defendant that he would be subjected to
physical force presently. State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).
In the context of escape, the threat or use of
unlawful physical force alleged in support of a
compulsion defense must be at least that which
would cause substantial bodily injury. State v.
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).

-Instructions.
Trial court's instruction requiring that the
threat of substantial bodily injury be specific
was proper at defendant's trial for escape. State
v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
Trial court properly instructed the jury that

the duress defense was not available in response to an escape charge unless there was no
time for complaint to the authorities or there
was a history of futile complaints. State v.
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
Trial court properly instructed the jury that
duress would not be a defense to an escape
charge unless the defendant reported to the
authorities immediately after the escape. State
v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).

Standard.
Where record was replete with evidence that
would sustain, if not compel, a finding that
defendant was not coerced or threatened with
immediate use of unlawful physical force when
he aided and abetted in rape, there was no need
to determine whether to use a subjective or
objective standard as to defendant's perception
of coercion or threat of force. State v. Alexander,
597 P.2d 890 (Utah 1979).
Defendant's claim of compulsion in prosecution for theft was rejected because the defendant failed to demonstrate specific imminent
threats and that there were no reasonable legal
alternatives to committing the crime. State v.
Ott, 763 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 148.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49.
A.LR. - Coercion, compulsion, or duress as
defense to charge of kidnapping, 69 A.L.R.4th
1005.
Construction and application of statutes justifying the use of force to prevent the use of
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force against another, 71 A.L.R.4th 940.
Defense of necessity, duress, or coercion in
prosecution for violation of state narcotics laws,
1 A.L.R.5th 938.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: compulsion,
duress, necessity, or "hostage syndrome" defense, 8 A.L.R.5th 713.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e.. 38.

Entrapment.

(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be
32
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made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may
permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-303, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-303.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
actions relating to stolen property. State v.
Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).

ANALYSIS

Consent to police visits.
Evidence of past offenses.
Government contact.
Hearsay.
Jury question.
Nature of defense.
Objective standard.
Offense involving threat of injury.
Officer's contact indirect.
Providing opportunity to commit offense.
Specific police conduct.
- Persistent requests by officer.
-Use of attractive female undercover officer.
- Use of relationship.
Consent to police visits.
Defendant was not entrapped for unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance,
although police officer visited the defendant's
office on several occasions, because the visits
were with defendant's invitation or consent.
State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986).
Evidence of past offenses.
State is not permitted during its case in chief
at trial to introduce into evidence past offenses
committed by defendant; however, when entrapment is an issue, state may present any
evidence in impeachment or rebuttal that
would show defendant's disposition to commit
the crime charged, and the fact that this may
include prior acts of crime or misconduct would
not render such evidence inadmissible. State v.
Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).
Where defendant charged with attempted
theft by receiving stolen property raised defense of entrapment, it was reversible error to
permit undercover police officer to testify on
direct examination in state's case in chief as to
matters relating to defendant's previous trans-
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Government contact.
The improper manner in which the government used an informant to obtain evidence for
the defendant's conviction did not entitle the
defendant to a dismissal based on entrapment
since the government's conduct did not taint
the informant's contact with the defendant. The
statutory entrapment defense is available only
if there is impropriety by the government in its
contacts with the defendant, to the extent that
an ordinary person in the defendant's situation
would be induced to commit a crime; the relationship evaluated in an entrapment defense
claim must directly involve the government
and the party claiming to be entrapped. State v.
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The entrapment defense focuses not on the
government's relationship with the informant,
but on the government's relationship with the
defendant, so that defendant's willful supplying
of drugs to an informant who employed no
extraordinary inducements was not the result
of entrapment, despite the informant's status
as a convicted felon and known drug abuser.
State v. Gallegos, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct.
App. 1993).
Hearsay.
Excluded testimony offered, not to prove the
truth of what informant said to defendants, but
rather to show that informant made statements that induced defendants to commit the
offense should not have been excluded as hearsay since truth of statements was irrelevant,
the crucial factor being whether statements
were made and whether they influenced the
defendants' behavior. State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d
366 (Utah 1980).

76-2-303

CRIMINAL CODE

Jury question.
Where private citizen warned authorities
that defendants were coming from California to
Utah for purpose of robbing some Utah drugstores and thereafter drove the defendants
around to various drugstores at their request
and where government's conduct was limited to
placing a listening device on the informant and
tailing defendants until they carried out their
preconceived intentions, entrapment was a factual question properly presented to the jury.
State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah 1980).
The question of entrapment was properly left
to the jury, where an undercover police officer,
who had reason to believe that defendant was
involved in drug trafficking, asked defendant to
sell him cocaine on four occasions over a fortyday period and, on the fourth contact, defendant agreed to sell him cocaine, made arrangements to pick it up, and sold him a gram. State
v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986).
Nature of defense.
Though it is sometimes said that entrapment
is an affirmative defense, it is properly regarded as a factor tending to raise a reasonable
doubt that defendant freely and voluntarily
committed the offense charged; in determining
the validity of an entrapment defense, the court
must therefore consider (1) whether it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was
the result of defendant's voluntary will and
desire to commit it, or (2) whether it was
induced or motivated by actions of the prosecution; if evidence as to the second proposition
raises a reasonable doubt as to the validity of
the first, there can be no conviction. State v.
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); State v.
Casias, 567 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1977).
An otherwise law-abiding person induced by
a police officer or agent to commit a crime has a
valid defense of entrapment, but when it is
known or suspected that a person is or desires
to be engaged in criminal activity, providing
him with an opportunity to carry out his intentions does not constitute entrapment. State v.
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975).
The critical issue in an entrapment defense is
whether the crime is mainly the product of the
defendant's own intent and desire and is thus
his voluntary act, or whether it is mainly the
product of some incitement or inducement by
the police; statute made no substantial change
in meaning of prior Supreme Court rulings in
regard to when entrapment occurs. State v.
Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978), but see
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).

the police conduct revealed in the particular
case falls below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power; the subjective test is specifically
rejected. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah
1979).
The objective test does not prohibit the police
from affording a person an opportunity to commit crime; it only prohibits active inducements
on the part of the government for the purpose of
luring an "average" person into the commission
of an offense. State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366
(Utah 1980); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah
1979).
Under objective test for entrapment, focus is
directed toward conduct of police, and reaction
of an "average person" to police conduct is not a
standard against which a defendant is to be
evaluated to determine if he was entrapped;
rather, circumstances of each defendant should
be considered in relation to police conduct.
Therefore, jury instruction was reversible error
that provided, in addition to statutory definition of entrapment, that "In assessing the police conduct under the defense of entrapment,
the test to determine an unlawful entrapment
is whether a law enforcement official or an
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the commission of an offense, induced the defendant to
commit such offense by persuasion or inducement which would be effective to persuade an
average person, other than one who was merely
given the opportunity to commit the offense."
State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 1984).
Personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals
to extreme vulnerability may, under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to constitute
illegal inducement. However, such matters as
the character of the suspect, his predisposition
to commit the offense, and his subjective intent
are irrelevant. If the police conduct would create a substantial risk that a normal law-abiding person would be induced to commit a crime,
entrapment has occurred regardless of the predisposition of the defendant. State v. Wright,
744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The test for determining whether a defendant has been entrapped is whether police
conduct used in obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense rose to the level of inducement or persuasion that would effectively persuade the average person to commit the
offense. State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271 (Ct. App.
1989).

Objective standard.
This statute by its express terms incorporates an objective standard, under which the
focus is not on the propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether

34

Offense involving threat of injury.
Defendant, charged with aggravated robbery
under§ 76-6-302(1)(a), was not entitled to the
defense of entrapment, because the threat of
bodily injury, which precludes entrapment, was
a necessarily implied element of the offense
charged. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah
1988).
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Officer's contact indirect.
In a prosecution for unlawful distribution for
value of a controlled substance, the facts relied
on by the defendant - repeated telephone
requests by a third party, who had been contacted by a police officer, and promises of a
large profit - were insufficient to constitute
illegal inducement where the officer was unaware of the defendant's identity, and the third
party was not directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer in relation to a specific
individual. State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60 (Utah
1986).
Providing opportunity to commit offense.
Defendant was not entrapped, but was provided only the opportunity to commit the offense of attempt to receive stolen property,
where police undercover agent, who had previously sold stolen items to the defendant, took a
television set to defendant's place of business
and told defendant the television was stolen,
when in fact it was not stolen, and defendant
then purchased the television. State v.
Sommers, 569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Specific police conduct.
-Persistent requests by officer.
Defendant's conviction of distribution of a
controlled substance was reversed as there existed a reasonable doubt as to whether the
offense was the product of the defendant's initiative and desire or was induced by the persistent requests of an undercover agent where it
was the undercover agent who first suggested
the purchase of marijuana from the defendant;
it was the agent who renewed contact with the
defendant after their initial meeting which he
followed up by calling the defendant at least
five times in attempting to purchase marijuana; and there was no evidence that the
defendant had previously possessed or dealt in
the drug. State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238
(Utah 1980).
Where defendant sold marijuana after persistent requests by undercover police officer,
where officer first approached defendant with
no prior knowledge that defendant was involved in drugs, and where defendant testified
that he made the sale in order to be a friend to
the officer, a conviction for distributing a controlled substance was found to be the result of
entrapment in that the inducement was such
that would be effective to persuade an average
person to commit the offense, and more than
just the affording of an opportunity. State v.
Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984).
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-Use

of attractive female undercover officer.
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive
female undercover police officer to sell stolen
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may
have been encouraged to suggest that his relationship with the officer become more intimate.
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).
Defendant was not entrapped into a violation
of the controlled substances law merely because the undercover officers who purchased
narcotics from him were female, where there
was no evidence that the officers used their
attractiveness to encourage defendant to commit the offense. State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988).
-Use of relationship.
Evidence that defendant was motivated to
accommodate police informer because of his
sympathy, his pity, and his close personal relationship with her established as a matter oflaw
that the informer induced defendant to buy
heroin for her by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by
one not otherwise ready to commit it; state's
inducement of the crime's commission by defendant was a perversion of the proper standards
of administration of criminal law. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).
Friendship alone does not constitute entrapment, and entrapment was not established
where defendant presented evidence that a
confidential informant and he were ''friends,
although the informant did not consider himself as a 'friend.'" State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497
(Utah 1989).
The µiere existence of a personal relationship
does not establish entrapment. Entrapment
requires some exploitation of the personal relationship. State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993).
Although the state, through an undercover
officer, exploited a close personal relationship
with defendant, there was no nexus between
the p~rsonal relationship and defendant's offer
of cocaine. State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1356
(Utah 1993).
There was no nexus between parties' personal relationship and defendant's actions in
approaching undercover officer and inquiring
whether she could help him procure a pound of
marijuana. State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
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COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - If the
Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is the
Next Target? -An Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1993).
Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 202.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58.
A.L.R. - Larceny: entrapment or consent,
10 A.L.R.3d 1121.
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as
precluding justification of arrest or imprisonment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963.
Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings, 41 A.L.R.3d 418.
Admissibility of evidence of other offenses in
rebuttal of defense of entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3d
293.
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Entrapment as a defense in proceedings to
revoke or suspend license to practice law or
medicine, 61 A.L.R.3d 357.
Modem status of the law concerning entrapment to commit narcotics offense - state cases,
62 A.L.R.3d 110.
Burden of proof as to entrapment defense state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775.
Entrapment as defense to charge of selling or
supplying narcotics where government agents
supplied narcotics to defendant and purchased
them from him, 9 A.L.R.5th 464.
Right of criminal defendant to raise entrapment defense based on having dealt with other
party who was entrapped, 15 A.L.R.5th 39.
Actions by state official involving defendant
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law
37.

Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.

(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake offact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable
reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he
believed.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 196, § 76•2-804; 1974, ch. 82, § 5.
COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Ignorance or Mistake
of Law Revisited, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 473.
Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 141, 142.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§§ 93 to 95.
Key Numbers. - Criminal law
32, 33.
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Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.

(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a violation of Section
76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-404.1;
or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the actor mistakenly
believed the victim to be 14 years of age or older at the time of the alleged
offense or was unaware of the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a violation
of Section 76-5-401, or an attempt to commit that crime, that the actor
mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 2.

76-2-305. Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of
alcohol or other substance voluntarily
consumed - Definition.
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as
"insanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected
alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged
offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental
illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that substantially
impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental
defect may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of
a physical or mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental
retardation. Mental illness does not mean a personality or character disorder
or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested during the developmental period as defined by the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-305, enacted by L.
1983,ch.49,§ 1;1986,ch.120,§
1;1990,ch.
306, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1983, ch. 49, § 1 repealed former § 76-2-305
(L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-305), relating to men-
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tal_ disease
or defect, and enacted present § 762 305 _
Cross-References. - Inquiry into insanity
of defendant, Rule 21.5, R.Crim.P.
Mental examination,§ 77-14-4.
Notice of defense, § 77-14-3.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Procedure does not require a defendant to assert a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity
as a condition precedent to the availability of a
guilty and mentally ill instruction and verdict.
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).

.ANALYSIS

Arrest of judgment.
Determination of sanity of accused.
Fact question.
Instructions.
Involuntary intoxication.
Lay witness.
Mens rea.
Presumption and burden of proof.
Proof required.
Raising issue.
Relatives, insanity of.
Responsibility.
Cited.

Involuntary intoxication.
The trial court correctly found that a claim of
involuntary intoxication falls under the mental
illness standard in this section. State v.
Gardner, 870 P.2d 900 (Utah 1993).

Arrest of judgment.
Where an alienist specifically found defendant competent to proceed to sentencing, trial
court did not err in refusing to arrest judgment
despite the fact that defendant may have suffered from an undetermined "mental illness."
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988).
Determination of sanity of accused.
The sanity of a person charged with a crime
could be determined at any stage of the proceeding in the manner provided by law, and
defendant under judgment of death with execution of sentence suspended and with no day
fixed for execution of sentence was "charged
with a crime." State v. Green, 88 Utah 491, 55
P.2d 1324 (1936).
Fact question.
Question of sanity or insanity of anyone accused of commission of crime is a question of
fact primarily for jury determination. State v.
Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940 (1925).
Instructions.
Instructions on insane delusions or hallucinations would not be given in absence of supporting evidence. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6
P.2d 177 (1931).
In murder prosecution, instructions charging
jury that defendant should be acquitted if they
had reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity
were proper. State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40
P.2d 961 (1935).
Where trial court gave insanity instruction
similar to that approved in State v. Green, 78
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, (1931), based on a combination of the M'Naghten and "irresistible
impulse" rules, but stated in the course of the
instruction that insanity may be present where
the defendant is "irresponsible or partly irresponsible," there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of this section, and giving of instruction was not reversible error.
State v. Dominguez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977).
Rule 21.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
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Lay witness.
Court did not commit error in excluding lay
witness testimony of defendant's insanity
where defendant did not manifest any obvious
symptoms of insanity from which the lay witness could reliably form a judgment. State v.
Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978).
Mens rea.
A defendant can be found mentally ill even
though his mental illness does not entirely
negate the mens rea of the crime charged. A
defendant who suffers from a mental disease or
defect and therefore is mentally ill as defined
by this section but is found to possess the state
of mind necessary to commit the crime charged,
despite his illness, should be found guilty and
mentally ill. State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621
(Utah 1987).
Presumption and burden of proof.
Under former § 76-1-41, sanity was presumed, thus casting on defendant duty of going
forward with evidence; when evidence tending
to show that accused was insane was presented, the presumption of sanity disappeared
and jury was no longer concerned with presumption, but had to determine fact of sanity or
insanity solely from evidence. State v. Hadley,
65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940 (1925); State v. Green,
78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931).
When testimony had been introduced to overcome presumption of sanity, burden of proof
shifted and it was incumbent upon state to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant
was sane at time of commission of offense. State
v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940 (1925).
Proof required.
Reasonable doubt in minds of jury as to
sanity of accused entitled him to acquittal.
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931).
The defense of "mental disease or defect"
statutorily requires the same quantum and
quality of proof to successfully obtain an acquittal as is required when one tries to defend on
the ground of"insanity." State v. Baer, 638 P.2d
517 (Utah 1981).
Raising issue.
It was duty of judge, not jury, to determine
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sufficiencyof evidence to raise issue of sanity of
accused; judge should have submitted issue to
jury if he thought there was some evidence
tending to show accused's insanity at time of
alleged offense. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6
P.2d 177 (1931).

Relatives, insanity of.
Insanity of collateral blood relatives of person being investigated for insanity was proper
matter of inquiry. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
6 P.2d 177 (1931).
Responsibility.
For cases discussing insanity as negating

76-2-306

criminal responsibility under former law, see
People v. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 P. 902 (1888),
rev'd on other grounds, 130 U.S. 83, 9 S. Ct.
435, 32 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1889); State v.
Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 P. 632, 1916D
L.R.A. 590, 1916C Ann. Cas. 537 (1913); State
v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931).

Cited in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254
(Utah 1988); State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27
(Utah 1990); State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah
1993); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill
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Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to
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A.L.R.3d 1228.
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or hospital reports, 55 A.L.R.3d 551.
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A.L.R.4th 1178.
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76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element
of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an
element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-806, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-806.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Glue sniffing.
Instructions.
- Erroneous instruction.
Jury question.
Recklessness.
Second degree murder.
Cited.

ANALYSIS

Effect.
Evidence.
-Conflicting.
-Sufficiency for conviction.
-Sufficiency for instruction.
First degree murder.
Formation of intent.

Effect.
Intoxication, even when sufficient to negate a
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culpable mental state, does not absolve a person from all criminal liability. State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

Evidence.
-Conflicting.
Notwithstanding testimony by defendant's
ex-wife and girlfriend that he was an alcoholic
and exceedingly drunk on day of alleged crime,
testimony of clerk that he was not drunk, in her
opinion, when he cashed check supported jury's
belief that defendant's guilt on charge of uttering forged check had been established beyond
reasonable doubt and that defendant's intoxication was not a defense. State v. Canfield, 26
Utah 2d 149, 486 P.2d 1034 (1971).
-Sufficiency for conviction.
In prosecution for first degree murder, evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction and
defendant's defense, based on effect of a drug on
his mental condition, was placed before jury
under proper instruction by court; defendant
had full benefit of his defense for jury to determine. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355
P.2d 689 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82
S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1961).
-Sufficiency for instruction.
Evidence in homicide case tended to show
that mind of accused was affected by excessive
use of intoxicating liquor at time of alleged
crime; this was sufficient to entitle him to a
proper instruction on law applicable to intoxication. State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d
1050, 79 A.L.R. 878 (1931).
It was not error to refuse to instruct jury on
effect of intoxication of accused at time of
alleged perpetration of the crime where the
evidence, both as to time and degree of intoxication, was not sufficient to justify a jury's
seriously considering it in determining motive
or intent of accused. State v. Gunn, 102 Utah
422, 132 P.2d 109 (1942).
There was no rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of manslaughter and
convicting him of negligent homicide, when the
only issue relevant to the choice was defendant's awareness of the risk of death, and any
absence of awareness could only have been due
to voluntary intoxication, making unawareness
immaterial under this section. State v. Day, 815
P.2d 1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
First degree murder.
Evidence that defendant had been drinking
did not provide a defense to a first degree
murder charge alleging the murder was committed during a robbery; to establish voluntary
intoxication as a defense to that charge, it was
necessary to show defendant's mind had been
affected to such an extent that he did not have
the capacity to form the requisite specific intent

40

or purpose, prior to the murder, to commit
robbery. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
If voluntary intoxication is so great as to
negate the existence of a necessary specific
intent for first degree murder, the crime is
reduced to second degree murder. State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1982).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction of
attempted first degree murder notwithstanding
stipulated evidence that his blood alcohol level
was .203 after the event, where he was aware of
his surroundings and was able to understand
and answer questions, and he exhibited speed,
dexterity, and strength in fleeing from the
scene of the crime. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135 (Utah 1989).

Formation of intent.
Instruction in language of statute dealing
with effect of intoxication was insufficient
where jury was not also advised they could not
convict accused of first degree murder if his
intoxication rendered him mentally incapable
of having the requisite premeditation, malice
and intent; jury should also have been instructed to consider effect of accused's epilepsy
and diseased thyroid where it was contended
those conditions affected his mental capacity to
deliberate and premeditate. State v. Anselmo,
46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915).
Since particular intent was not necessary
element for offense of sodomy and offense could
not have been committed by accident or while
intending to do some other act, instruction on
the defense of intoxication was not proper.
State v. Turner, 3 Utah 2d 285, 282 P.2d 1045
(1955).
Second degree burglary involved intent to
commit larceny; if because of voluntary intoxication accused did not have necessary intent
jury should have taken into consideration evi~
dence of intoxication in determining existence
of intent. State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396
P.2d 749 (1964).
While long continued intoxication may produce a physical deterioration or disease of the
brain to such an extent that a person may not
be held to have a particular criminal state of
mind, expert testimony was required to establish such a pathological mental state as a
defense in the guilt phase of a capital offense
trial. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981)
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L:
Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
Voluntary intoxication did not provide a defense to charges of attempted homicide, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery
where at time of commission of the offenses
defendant did not have a mental state that
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having testified that defendant was not incapacitated, and deputy sheriffs who examined
him shortly after the shooting having testified
that he talked intelligently and did not appear
to be intoxicated. State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329
(Utah 1989).

prevented the formation of a specific intent to
accomplish what he did. State v. Bush, 646 P.2d
748 (Utah 1982).

Glue sniffing.
Instruction based on principle of voluntary
intoxication, in case where one of defenses to
murder charge was voluntary intoxication from
"glue sniffing," did not pre-empt or neutralize
area covered by insanity instruction based on
M'Naghten Rule; even though intoxication from
glue sniffing may differ in effect from other
types of intoxication, it was nonetheless intoxication that, if voluntary, clearly fell within
purpose, reach and application of general principle of voluntary intoxication. Pierce v. Turner,
276 F. Supp. 289 (D. Utah 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d
109 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950,
89 S. Ct. 1290, 22 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1969).
Instructions.
Under former § 76-1-22 declaring that accused could show he was in such a state of
intoxication at time homicide was committed as
to be incapable of forming necessary intent, it
was reversible error to instruct that evidence of
drunkenness was admissible only on question
of premeditation and that drunkenness was
immaterial in cases of premeditated murder.
State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912).
Even though trial court's instruction on effect
of intoxication in second degree burglary was
long, repetitious and went further than statutory requirement by requiring premeditation
and deliberation for second-degree burglary
rather than mere intent to commit larceny,
instruction was not prejudicial. State v.
Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d 749 (1964).
In second-degree burglary trial comment by
court made in response to question from jury
during instruction that "If he is so stupidly
drunk that he doesn't know anything, you just
as well bring in a verdict of not guilty," was not
a misstatement of the law and was not prejudicial error. State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123,
396 P.2d 749 (1964).
In a prosecution for burglary and theft, instructing the jury that defendant could be
found guilty of a lesser, uncharged offense of
public intoxication would have usurped the
prosecutor's discretion for determining which
charges to bring and confused the central issues before the jury. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d
461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
-Erroneous instruction.
Erroneous intoxication instruction at defendant's trial for a shooting homicide was harmless error, where the evidence was very limited
as to the degree of his intoxication and whether
it affected his actions in any way, eyewitnesses
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Jury question.
Whether accused was in such condition of
mind, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise,
as to be capable of deliberate premeditation
became material subject of consideration for
jury in murder prosecution upon introduction
of evidence tending to show defendant was
intoxicated at time of alleged homicide. Hopt v.
Utah, 104 U.S. 631, 26 L. Ed. 873 (1881).
On trial of indictment for murder in which
defense was that defendant was under influence of intoxicating liquor and marijuana so
that he was incapable of forming intent to kill,
it was for jury to determine from evidence
whether defendant was in fact so intoxicated by
liquor or his faculties numbed by use of marijuana that he was incapable of forming or had
no premeditated motive or design to kill deceased. State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 P.727
(1930).
Recklessness.
Evidence of an alleged "alcoholic blackout" is
inadmissible as a defense to a manslaughter
charge, since the requisite mens rea of a manslaughter charge is recklessness, and voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to a crime based on
reckless acts. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257
(Utah 1985).
A defendant's voluntary intoxication did not
preclude his conviction for aggravated assault,
since criminal responsibility for that crime can
be established through recklessness, and voluntary intoxication does not absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless acts.
State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985).
Second degree murder.
In developing a defense strategy around defendant's voluntary intoxication on the night of
the murder, defense counsel was statutorily
limited to showing that the alcohol deprived
defendant of the capacity to form the mental
state necessary for second-degree murder. Unless defense counsel could make that precise
showing, evidence of defendant's excessive intoxication would have been wholly counterproductive. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993).
Cited in State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah
1986); State v. Wade, 725 P.2d 1316 (Utah
1986).
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Utah Law Review. - Pathological Intoxication and the Voluntarily Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 419.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 155.

76-2-307. Voluntary
fense.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 109.
A.L.R. - Modem status of the rules as to
voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal
charge, 8 AL.R.3d 1236.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®= 56.

termination

of efforts prior to of-

It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's criminal
responsibility arises from his own conduct or from being a party to an offense
under Section 76-2-201 [76-2-202] that prior to the commission of the offense,
the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either:
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities or
the intended victim; or
(2) Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-307, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-307.
Compiler's Notes. - The bracketed refer-

ence to§ 76-2-202 was inserted by the compiler
to correct an apparent error.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stuffed inside raincoat in apparent attempt to
avoid arrest after having been observed was not
a "voluntary" act within meaning of this section; furthermore, evidence indicated that
crime of theft had already been completed so
that there could be no effective withdrawal or
termination; accordingly, refusal to instruct on
defendant's theory of voluntary termination of
criminal conduct was not error. State v. Eagle,
611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Time of termination.
Voluntariness.
Time of termination.
'lb be a valid defense, the termination must
occur before the commission of the crime. State
v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578 (Utah 1977).
Voluntariness.
Alleged shoplifter's act of dropping suits

COLLATERALREFERENCES
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 122.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®= 31.

76-2-308.

Affirmative defenses.

Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-308, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-308.

Cross-References. - Affirmative defenses,
Title 77, Chapter 14.

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 183.
C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 688,
689.

Key Numbers. seq., 330.
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PART4
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-401.

Justification

as defense -When

allowed.

Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based
on the conduct. The defense of justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under
the circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this
part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his
duties as a governmental officer or employee;
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by
parents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in
custody under the laws of the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under the
laws of this state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-401, enacted by L
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-401.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Instruction.
When there is a basis in the evidence,
whether produced by the prosecution or by the
defendant, that would provide some reasonable
basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was
done to protect the defendant from an immi-

nent threat of death by another, an instruction
on self-defense should be given the jury, and the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was not in
self-defense. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah
1985).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide

§ 110.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49.
A.LR. - "Choice of evils," necessity, duress,
or similar defense to state or local criminal
charges based on acts of public protest, 3
A.L.R.5th 521.

76-2-402.

Necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without operator's license or
while license is suspended, 7 A.L.R.5th 73.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: compulsion,
duress, necessity, or "hostage syndrome" defense, 8 A.L.R.5th 713.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law
38.

Fo:rce in defense of person defined.

Forcible felony

(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force.However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only ifhe or she reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person
as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
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(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission
or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement,
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force; and
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, constitute "combat by agreement":
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal
right to be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c).
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape,
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to
create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not
constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time
unlawful entry is made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 6;
1991,ch.10,§
5;1994,ch.26, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection (3)
substituted "aggravated murder, murder" for
"murder in the first and second degree" and
made minor changes in punctuation and style
throughout the section.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
inserted "or she" throughout the section; inserted "as a result of the other's imminent use
of unlawful force" in Subsection (1); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (3), and (5); added the of-
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fenses beginning with "rape of a child" and
ending with "aggravated sexual abuse of a
child" to the list of forcible felonies in Subsection (4); and made related and stylistic
changes.
Legislative Intent. - Laws 1994, ch. 26,
§ 2 provides: "Amendments made by this act to
Section 76-2-402, regarding self defense, are
intended to clarify that justification of the use
of force in defense of a person applies equally to
all persons including victims of abuse in ongoing relationships. It is intended that otherwise
competent evidence regarding a victim's response to patterns of domestic abuse or violence

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
be considered by the trier of fact in determining
imminence or reasonableness in accordance
with that section, and that the evidence be

76-2-402

considered when useful in understanding the
perceptions or conduct of a witness."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
drawn guns searched train for suspected strikebreakers was admissible as tending to show
which party was probable aggressor. State v.
Pagialakis, 65 Utah 552, 238 P. 256 (1925).

ANALYSIS

Burden of proof.
Evidence.
-Habit or character of victim.
-Imminent danger.
- Probable aggressor.
Forcible ejection.
Instructions.
Jury question.
Provocation.
Retreat.
Self-defense denied.
Standard.
Cited.

Forcible ejection.
Conviction of murder in first degree for homicide growing out of forcible ejection of defendant from beer parlor by deceased peace officer
who was not in uniform was sustained although defendant claimed self-defense. State v.
BeBee, 113 Utah 398, 195 P.2d 746 (1948).

Burden of proof.
When defendant offered proof of self-defense
he was entitled to acquittal if he had produced
sufficient evidence of his justification to create
in minds of jury reasonable doubt of his guilt of
offense charged. State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331,
199 P. 145 (1921).
A defendant is not required to establish a
defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence; he need only create a reasonable doubt
that he is guilty of the offense. State v. Knoll,
712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).
Evidence.
-Habit or character of victim.
Where defendant introduced issue of selfdefense based on theory that intoxication may
have partly caused deceased to have become
temporarily insane and aggressor in attempted
assault, possibility or probability of defendant's
story could be rebutted by testimony of abstemious habits or character of deceased. State v.
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948).
-Imminent danger.
A conviction of manslaughter, after a bench
trial, was contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence that defendant fatally shot her husband after his violent physical attack and
threats to kill her led her to believe that she
was in immediate danger of serious injury or
death. State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
-Probable aggressor.
In prosecution of striker for murder of acting
fireman on train carrying strike-breakers and
armed guards to mine, in which striker defended on ground of self-defense, evidence that
in month before killing, band of strikers with

Instructions.
If court gave correct statement of law of
self-defense, it was not reversible error to refuse instruction offered by defendant. People v.
Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 6 P. 49 (1885).
In prosecution for homicide, evidence was
sufficient to show that defendant was entitled
to full instructions on self-defense, right of
defendant to stand his ground, defense of relative or member of family and defense of habitation. State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145
(1921).
In prosecution of striker for murder of acting
fireman on train carrying strike-breakers and
armed guards to mine, requested instruction
that if band of strikers ran toward train to
picket it in peaceable manner and guards fired
at them, strikers had legal right to return fire
and if in so doing they killed deceased, they
were justified in so doing was properly refused
because it omitted very essence of right of
self-defense. State v. Pagialakis, 65 Utah 552,
238 P. 256 (1925).
Issue of self-defense in manslaughter prosecution was properly submitted to jury under
instruction permitting jury to determine
whether defendant had used greater force or
violence than reasonably appeared necessary to
him to prevent injury from witness or detention
by deceased, where evidence of use of excessive
force had been presented. State v. Johnson, 112
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947).
Instruction in manslaughter prosecution
that defendant could not claim self-defense if
he had entered into "mutual combat" with deceased was not prejudicial even though evidence failed to establish mutual combat in that
deceased did not intend to so engage, where
defendant's intent to strike deceased without
justification was in issue. State v. Johnson, 112
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947).
Where evidence clearly showed that defendant had no reason to fear deceased, defendant
was not entitled to instruction that he had a
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right to arm himself in advance if he anticipated the need for self-defense. State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972).
When there is a basis in the evidence,
whether produced by the prosecution or by the
defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing
was done to protect the defendant from an
imminent threat of death by another, an instruction on self-defense should be given the
jury, and the prosecution has the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense. State v. Knoll, 712
P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).
Although the language in an instruction stating that, in "mutual combat," only the use of
deadly force is not justified may not have been
an accurate statement of the law, it did not
prejudice defendant, since, if anything, it overstated the available defenses. State v. Pascual,
804 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Jury was not instructed on the elements of
aggravated assault since the victim's attack on
defendant occurred prior to defendant's shooting of victim, and therefore defendant's actions
were not justified as an attempt to prevent that
attack; the jury was adequately instructed on
defendant's self-defense theory. State v. Diaz,
859 P.2d 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Jury question.
Unless evidence was so conclusive that every
reasonable mind was compelled to find that
means and force used were necessary to defend
against aggression, question of whether killing
was in self-defense was for jury determination.
State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324
(1944).
Whether the defendant had reasonable
ground to believe that deceased was about to
take his life or do him great bodily harm,
whether it was his duty to resort to other
means of defense, whether he properly exercised his right of self-defense, whether he used
unnecessary force in killing his adversary,
whether he was justified in using a deadly
weapon when struck by fist or otherwise assaulted in a manner not likely to cause serious
bodily harm, whether he and deceased engaged
in a mutual or willing affray, and whether he or
decedent brought on fatal encounter were questions for determination by jury when evidence
was conflicting. State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147
P.2d 324 (1944).
Provocation.
Conviction of voluntary manslaughter was
affirmed where there was evidence that defendant was the aggressor in the altercation, and
there was insufficient showing of provocation.
State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46 (1938).
Retreat.
Instruction that, if human being killed an-
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other in self-defense or to protect himself
against great bodily injury which could not
otherwise have been avoided, the killing was
justifiable or excusable was not objectionable as
requiring defendant to retreat before he could
claim self-defense, in view of another instruction that person assailed need not flee or retreat, but may stand his ground and use all
necessary force to protect his person from great
bodily harm. State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192
P.2d 861 (1948).

Self-defense denied.
Where deceased first saw defendant in an act
of committing robbery and remonstrated with
him and later, after arming himself, returned to
scene of robbery whereupon defendant shot and
killed him, defendant could not claim self-defense and rely on former justifiable homicide
statute. State v. White, 40 Utah 342, 121 P. 579
(1912).
While defendant is entitled to an acquittal if
the evidence raises a reasonable doubt whether
he acted in self-defense, no such doubt existed
in manslaughter case where defendant, after
seeing his father accosted by two men who then
let the father go, called the men back to the car
he was driving, scuffled with one, then shot him
twice. State ex rel. Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187
(Utah 1975).
Defendant in a murder case was not entitled
to an instruction on self-defense where the
evidence unmistakably showed that the defendant was the aggressor in moving toward the
victim with a gun while the victim, even though
he picked up a club, continued to back away
from the defendant. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d
261 (Utah 1980).
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnapping was not entitled to a jury instruction on
self-defense where defendant's claim that victim was aggressor in struggle was without
sufficient support in evidence to give rise to a
reasonable doubt as to whether defendant
acted in self-defense. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d
587 (Utah 1984).
Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of assault by a prisoner, implicitly rejecting statutory defenses of self-defense and defense of
habitation, was supported by the evidence.
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Standard.
In prosecution for assault with intent to
murder, it was not essential in all cases that
alleged assailant was in fact armed in order to
justify one who was accused of shooting to act
or shoot in self-defense; but accused must have
acted as reasonable man and not shot another
without at least good apparent cause for doing
so. State v. Molitz, 40 Utah 443, 122 P. 86
(1912).

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Under common law, there must have been
actual necessity for homicide, but under statutes and decisions of courts of several states,
homicide is justifiable if there exists in mind of
slayer reasonable belief that necessity exists.
State v. Turrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P. 108, 25
A.L.R. 497 (1919).
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Cited in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254
(Utah 1988); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769
(Utah Ct.App. 1991); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d
554 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Guilty of Survival:
State v. Strieby and Battered Women Who Kill
in Utah, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 979.
Brigham Young Law Review. - The Legitimacy of Vigilanteism, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
1261.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery §§ 63, 69 to 80; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide§ 139.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery
§§ 87-93; 40 C.J.S. Homicide§ 113 et seq.
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence as to
other's character or reputation for turbulence
on question of self-defense by one charged with
assault or homicide, 1 A.L.R.3d 571.
Relationship with assailant's wife as provocation depriving defendant of right of selfdefense, 9 A.L.R.3d 933.
Homicide: duty to retreat where assailant

and assailed share the same living quarters, 26
A.L.R.3d 1296.
Homicide: duty to retreat as condition of
self-defense when one is attacked at his office,
or place of business or employment, 41 A.L.R.3d
584.
Homicide: modem status of rules as to burden and quantum of proof to show self-defense,
43 A.L.R.3d 221.
Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant's belief, for purposes
of self-defense claim, that physical force is
necessary - modem cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: battered
spouse syndrome as defense to homicide or
other criminal offense, 11 A.L.R.5th 871.
Key Numbers. -Assault and battery e=>67,
68; Homicide e= 109.

76-2-403. Force in arrest.
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he
reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or
another from bodily harm while making an arrest.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-403.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Burden of proof in civil action for
using unreasonable force in making arrest as to
reasonableness of force used, 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly force.
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and
assistance, is justified in using deadly force when:
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in accordance with the
judgment of a competent court in executing a penalty of death;
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following
an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by escape; and
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or
47
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(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if
apprehension is delayed;
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another
person.
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior to any
use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c).
History: C. 1958, 76-2-404, enacted by L.
1986,ch.94,§ 1;1987,ch.92,§
153.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1986, ch. 94, § 1 repealed former § 76-2-404,
as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-404,

relating to the use of deadly force by a peace
officer, and enacted the present section, effective April 28, 1986.
Cross-References. - Arrest, Title 77,
Chapter 7.

COLLATERAL
REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Singer v. Wadman:
Lawful Use of Force?, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 365.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide
§ 134.

76-2-405.

C.J.S. - 40 C.J.S. Homicide§ 104.
Key Numbers. - Homicide <S:;, 103.

Force in defense of habitation.

(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation;
however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner,
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal
violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or ·deadly force in defense of habitation is
presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted
reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or
attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or
surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony.
History: C. 1958, 76-2-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; 1985, ch. 252, § 1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Defendant's appearances at his estranged
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him
no proprietary right or justification to consider
or treat the apartment as his own ''habitation,"
and his aggravated assault on his wife's overnight male companion was therefore not justified by this section. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Habitation.
Legislative intent.
Presumption that action reasonable.
Unlawful and forcible entry.

Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of assault by a prisoner, implicitly rejecting statutory defenses of self-defense and defense of
habitation, was supported by the evidence.
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Habitation.
Defendant in murder prosecution, who killed
decedent after the latter refused to leave defendant's sister's house, was entitled to raise this
section as a defense, notwithstanding the fact
that the sister's house was not defendant's own;
the rule of this section is a codification of the
common-lawprinciple that "a man's home is his
castle," from which he may exclude intruders
by use of reasonable force, and its aim is to
preserve the peace and good order of society;
therefore, it is to be broadly construed, and
applies not only to acts in defense of a person's
actual residence, but any place he may be
peacefully occupying as a home or habitation,
including a hotel or motel room, or the home of
another in which he is a guest. State v.
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

Legislative intent.
The legislature intended to exclude actions of
peace officers in the course of their duties from
the category of intrusions that may be lawfully
resisted. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah
1991).
Presumption that action reasonable.
Since the addition of Subsection (2) by the
1985 amendment, a defendant need only show
that he was defending his habitation against
unlawful entry or attempted entry and, if he
used deadly force, that the unlawful entry was
violent, tumultuous, surreptitious, in stealth,
or for the purpose of committing a felony. If the
evidence establishing these facts is believed,
defendant's relevant actions and beliefs will be
presumed reasonable and the state must rebut
the presumption to invalidate the defense.
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Unlawful and forcible entry.
A finding as to whether the entry was unlawful and forcible is essential to the proper application of this section. State ex rel. R.J.Z., 736
P.2d 235 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.

76-2-406. Force in defense of property.
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal
property:
(1) lawfully in his possession; or
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-406, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-406.
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Legislative intent.
The legislature intended to exclude actions of
peace officers in the course of their duties from

the category of intrusions that may be lawfully
resisted. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah
1991).
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Section
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76-3-103.
76-3-104.
76-3-105.

76-3-206.
76-3-207.

Sentencing in accordance with
chapter.
Designation of offenses.
Felonies classified.
Misdemeanors classified.
Infractions.

76-3-207.5.
76-3-208.

Part2

Part3

Sentencing
76-3-201.

76-3-201.1.

76-3-201.2.
76-3-202.

76-3-203.

76-3-203.1.
76-3-203.2.

76-3-203.3.
76-3-204.
76-3-205.

forfeiture, and disqualification.
Capital felony - Penalties.
Capital felony - Sentencing
proceeding.
Applicability - Effect on sentencing - Options of offenders.
Imprisonment - Custodial authorities.

Sentences or combination of
sentences allowed - Definitions - Civil penalties Restitution - Hearing - Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences - Resentencing.
Nonpayment of fine or restitution as contempt - Imprisonment - Relief where default
not contempt - Collection of
default.
Civil action by victim for damages.
Paroled persons - Termination
or discharge from sentence Time served on parole - Discretion of Board of Pardons
and Parole.
Felony conviction - Indeterminate term of imprisonment Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
Offenses committed by three or
more persons - Enhanced
penalties.
Definitions - Use of firearm in
offenses committed on or
about school premises - Enhanced penalties.
Penalty for hate crimes - Civil
rights violation.
Misdemeanor conviction
Term of imprisonment.
Infraction conviction - Fine,

50

Fines and Special Sanctions
76-3-301.
76-3-301.5.
76-3-302.
76-3-303.

Fines of persons.
Uniform fine schedule - Judicial Council.
Fines of corporations, associations, partnerships, or government instrumentalities.
Additional sanctions against
corporation or association Advertising of conviction
Disqualification of officer.
Part4

Limitations and Special Provisions on
Sentences
76-3-401.
76-3-402.
76-3-403.
76-3-404.

76-3-405.
76-3-406.

76-3-407.

Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations.
Conviction of lower degree of
offense.
Credit for good behavior against
sentence for misdemeanor.
Presentence investigation and
diagnostic evaluation - Commitment of defendant - Sentencing procedure.
Limitation on sentence where
conviction or prior sentence
set aside.
Crimes for which probation,
suspension of sentence, lower
category of offense, or hospitalization is restricted - Exception.
Repeat and habitual sex offend-

